Technical Annex: the published lists
Last updated: 16 November 2026, enacting changes approved at IPTC Media Provenance Committee on 21 October 2026
The Certificate Policy and the Credential Policy say who is a Verified News Publisher and how a publisher’s certificates come to be listed. They do not depend on any one technology. This annex says how the list is published, the technical requirements a certificate must meet to appear on it, and how particular technologies use it.
This annex is part of the Verified News Publisher policy, and changes to it follow the same approval process. Support for a further technology is added as a new section, without changing the policies themselves.
1. The Verified News Publishers list
Published at: https://trust.iptc.org/end-entity-list.pem (also as verified-news-publishers-list.json)
Holds the certificates issued to Verified News Publishers by the IPTC-endorsed certificate authorities listed in the Certificate Policy. Each is an end-entity X.509 certificate that identifies the organisation that holds it.
Use. Any technology that identifies a signer by an X.509 certificate can use the list to recognise a Verified News Publisher: a signature made with a listed certificate was made by the Verified News Publisher it names. Sections 3 onwards say how particular technologies use it, and what each needs from the certificates on it.
Requirements. A certificate on the list MUST meet the requirements of every technology section below that applies to the list as a whole, so that the list works wherever it is used.
2. Supplementary lists
A technology may need certificates that a Verified News Publisher holds for that technology alone, and that cannot meet the requirements of the main list. Such certificates are published in a supplementary list, defined in that technology’s section. A supplementary list holds certificates of Verified News Publishers only, as the main list does, and is used only in the way its section describes. A certificate is never on both the main list and a supplementary list.
3. C2PA Content Credentials and CAWG identity assertions
3.1 Requirements on the main list
The CAWG Identity Assertion specification, version 1.2 §8.2.4.1, cites the main list for certificates that sign CAWG X.509 identity assertions. So that the list can be used in this way, every certificate on it:
- MUST follow the certificate profile defined in the C2PA 2.2 specification;
- MUST meet one of the X.509 trust routes in CAWG Identity Assertion 1.2 §8.2.4:
- the id-kp-documentSigning (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36) Extended Key Usage (EKU); or
- for identity assertions made until 31 March 2027 (§8.2.4.1), unless the CAWG specification extends that date: the id-kp-emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) EKU together with the certificate policy Organization-validated Multipurpose (2.23.140.1.5.2.2) or Organization-validated Strict (2.23.140.1.5.2.3).
3.2 Supplementary list: C2PA Conformance Program certificates
Published at: https://trust.iptc.org/claim-signing-list.pem (also as claim-signing-list.json)
Holds C2PA claim-signing certificates issued under the C2PA Conformance Program] for a signing product that a Verified News Publisher operates itself. These certificates do not carry the EKUs that section 3.1 requires, so they cannot go on the main list.
Requirements. A certificate on this list:
- MUST be issued under the C2PA Conformance Program, by a certificate authority on the C2PA Trust List, for a generator product that the C2PA Conformance Explorer shows as conformant;
- MUST carry the c2pa-kp-claimSigning (1.3.6.1.4.1.62558.2.1) EKU;
- MUST be for a product that the publisher operates, and that signs only for that publisher (Certificate Policy, requirement 6);
- MUST NOT meet the requirements of the main list. A certificate that does goes on the main list instead.
Such a certificate’s Common Name names the product rather than the organisation, so requirement 4 of the Certificate Policy applies to the other attributes of its Subject DN.
Issuers. This list’s route to a certificate (Certificate Policy, requirement 2) is the C2PA Conformance Program. For these certificates the IPTC relies on the C2PA Trust List and the C2PA Certificate Policy in place of its own criteria for certificate authorities, and there is no hand-off to a certificate authority.
Evidence. With the certificate, the applicant supplies the product’s C2PA Conformance Explorer record.
Withdrawal. If a product’s conformance is withdrawn, the IPTC accepts no further certificates for it. Certificates already listed stay, as on any list, so that content signed while the product was conformant can still be checked.
3.3 How C2PA and CAWG validators use the lists
- C2PA claim signature: the claim was signed by a Verified News Publisher if its signing certificate is on the main list or the supplementary list. For a certificate on the main list this holds whatever product made the signature; the product need not have been through the C2PA Conformance Program.
- CAWG X.509 identity assertion: the assertion was signed by a Verified News Publisher if its signing certificate is on the main list. The supplementary list never applies to identity assertions.
In both cases the listed certificate must belong to the organisation the validator reports. Validators should continue to use the validation rules defined in the C2PA Content Credentials specification, and for identity assertions the CAWG Identity Assertion specification, to decide whether to trust a certificate.